Study on bidding Mechanism of Water conservancy and hydropower project

【作者】 段文生；

【导师】 侯建国；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 结构工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 招投标是一种应用技术经济的评价方法和市场竞争机制的作用,有组织地择优成交的规范化交易方式。与西方国家相比,我国引入招投标制度的历史较短,有关配套制度和监督体制的研究起步较晚。因此,在我国招投标制度的实施过程中出现种种乱象,存在招投标竞争规则不科学、约束机制效率低、风险管理未重视、招投标机制待确立等多层次原因。大型水利水电工程除具备其他工程招投标的共性外,还因其体量大、工期长、风险因素多等特点,具有其个性特征。针对现阶段我国招投标实践中存在的主要问题及其原因分析,结合国内以法律和规章等外力推动的外生性招投标机制效率失灵的问题,本文利用博弈论和机制设计理论,结合本人20年来从事水利水电工程招标工作的实践经验总结,对内生性招投标机制开展深入系统的研究,以便利用招投标程序中内在因素的有机制约、控制、调整等作用,建立起内生性招投标机制,为在我国水利水电工程的招投标中引入内生性招投标机制提供科学依据和技术支持。主要研究结论如下。(1)采用博弈论方法分别分析了经评审的最低投标价法和综合评估法的均衡条件,对比分析了两种方法的优缺点、对合谋的影响和存在的主要风险与问题,并对经评审的最低投标价法和综合评估法提出了相应的若干改进建议。(2)通过国际招标与国内招标的对比分析,发现影响招投标机制运行效果的主要因素是竞争规则、约束机制和风险调节机制。(3)经评审的最低投标价法具有符合国际惯例和市场经济规律、方法简单且效率高、减少权力寻租等一系列优点。经评审的最低投标价法虽然杜绝了投标人与评标专家、招标代理和招标人工作人员的串标,降低了招标人的部分风险,但仍存在投标人之间串标、围标等合谋的可能性及投标人恶意降价的可能性。(4)经博弈分析发现,经评审的最低投标价法下围标等现象的发生与被发现的概率及发现后的惩罚力度等招投标约束机制有关。建议今后应加大招投标监察力度以增大围标、陪标等合谋现象被发现的概率,同时强化合谋现象发现后的处罚力度,如将组织串标的处罚金额由中标金额的(5-10)‰提高到2\%以上,以避免围标、陪标等合谋现象的发生。(5)针对国内目前广泛采用的综合评估法存在的主要问题,本文建议可从招标准备工作、报价评审标准、商务评审赋分比重、定性评审项目赋分标准、合同文件组成等方面对综合评估法进行改进。按本文建议改进后的综合评估法已在西霞院反调节水库工程招标中得到成功应用,验证了本文提出的综合评估法改进建议的合理性和实用性。(6)通过招投标约束机制的研究,提出了招投标约束机制的概念和构成,建议利用内生性制度约束的参与约束和价格约束对经评审的最低投标价法进行改进,从而可有效制约围标和串标等不法行为的发生。(7)本文提出的利用内生性制度约束的参与约束和价格约束对经评审的最低投标价法进行改进的建议如下：1)参与约束可通过在投标资格审查方面采取若干措施来实现：①招标公告和投标邀请函并用,邀请潜在投标人参加资格预审,解除完全围标的风险；②采用定量评审和设置关键评价因素,既评价潜在投标人的综合实力也重视其对本工程的技术和风险管理能力：③采用有限数量制,实行数量和分数双指标控制；④建议采用电子邮件发送资格预审结果通知书和招标文件等措施对资格预审结果保密,减小资格预审后的合谋机会。2)价格约束可通过设置招标控制价来实现：根据招标工程的具体情况和围标的可能性,设置合适的招标控制价,减小完全围标的动因和可能性,同时一旦存在完全围标可将招标人的风险限定在可接受的范围内。按本文建议改进后的经评审的最低投标价法已在龙背湾水电站工程招标中得到成功应用,验证了本文提出的经评审的最低投标价法的改进建议的合理性和实用性。(8)在分析工程项目风险及应对措施的基础上,利用博弈论研究了风险态度对投标报价的影响,分析了差额担保和评标澄清在招投标风险调节机制中的作用,为了避免经评审的最低投标价法带来的恶意降价风险等不当竞争现象的发生,建议在招投标过程中应充分发挥差额担保和评标澄清的作用。差额担保是避免经评审的最低投标价法下恶意降价的有效手段,建议取消《招标投标法实施条例》中履约保证10％的上限规定；提高差额保函的手续费,采用累进制的费率,以更好地发挥差额保函调节投标人风险态度的作用。评标澄清可以调节恶意降价风险的影响。某城市地铁工程和某大型水利枢纽工程在采用经评审的最低投标价法招标时,引入了本文建议的差额担保措施和评标澄清环节,取得了良好的应用效果,有效地避免了经评审的最低投标价法带来的恶意降价等不当竞争现象的发生,验证了本文提出的差额担保环节和评标澄清环节在调节投标人风险态度和风险影响方面的有效性和实用性。(9)按照机制设计理论的参与约束和激励相容等概念和思路,利用制度理论等研究工具,提出了内生性招投标机制的概念,分析了内生性招投标机制的构成要素和功能,提出了在我国水利水电工程招投标中引入内生性招投标机制的建议。(10)利用国外最新的演化博弈模型分析了招投标的制度变革和路径,研究了综合评估法和经评审的最低投标价法在博弈中的演化方向,预测了评标方法的发展趋势。经评审的最低投标价法优点众多,在国内推广应用的条件已基本具备,最低价中标的原则将是大势所趋,经评审的最低投标价法在国内的使用范围将会越来越广,中国的招投标市场必将与国际接轨。鉴于我国政府已郑重承诺最迟于2020年开放政府采购市场,建议在我国政府采购中和国有投资为主的水利水电工程项目的招投标中,积极推广应用经评审的最低投标价法,防止投标人的合谋行为。

【Abstract】 Bidding is a standardized mode of well-organized preferred deal applying technical-economic evaluation method and market competition mechanism. Compared with western countries, China has a short history of introducing the bidding system and research the relevant supporting and regulation systems. Therefore, there exist many chaos in the process of implementation due to multilevel reasons, e.g., inappropriate bidding competition rules, less efficient constrain mechanisms, under-appreciated risk management, and unavailable bidding mechanisms. In addition to the generality of other projects, the bidding of large water and hydropower projects is of individuality owing to the large scales, long construction periods and multiple risk factors. In the light of the main problems in China’s bidding practice and the reasons thereof, and combine with the failure of exogenous bidding mechanism driven by external forces such as laws and regulations, this paper systematically studies the endogenous bidding mechanism by applying the game theory and mechanism design theory and taking account of the author’s20-year experience in bidding, such that an endogenous bidding mechanism is established by taking advantage of the organic constriction, regulation and adjustment of external factors in the process of bidding, to provide scientific basis and technical support for introducing endogenous bidding mechanism to the bidding of water and hydropower engineering in China. The main conclusions are as follows:(1) Analyze the equilibrium conditions of the evaluated lowest tender price method (ELTPM) and the comprehensive evaluation method (CEM) using the game theory, compares the pros and cons, the effects on collusion, and major risks and problems of both methods, and recommend improvements for ELTPM and CEM.(2) Comparative analysis of international bidding and domestic bidding reveals that the main factors affecting the performance of bidding mechanisms are mainly competition rules, constrain mechanisms and risk adjustment mechanisms.(3) The ELTPM is advantageous in its compliance with international practices and market economy rules, simple and high efficiency, and reduction of rent-seeking. The ELTPM eliminates collusion between the bidders, bid evaluation experts, bidding agents and tenderee’s staff, and reduces part of the tenderee’s risks, yet there is possibility of bid-rigging and malicious price.(4) By game analysis, it is found that the occurrence of bid-rigging under ELTPM, the probability of discovery and the punishment upon discovery are all relevant with constraint mechanisms. It is suggested that more efforts be devoted to supervision, to increase the probability of discovery, and punishment of discovered bidding-rigging be strengthened, e.g., to increase the amount of punishment from5-10‰to over2\%, so as to avoid bid-rigging, accompanying and other collusions.(5) In terms of the main problems encountered in the CEM widely used in China, it is herein recommended to improve in the field of bidding preparation, bid evaluation criteria, commercial proposal rating proportion, qualitative evaluation rating criteria, and contract document composition. The success of such an improved CEM in the Xixiayuan Reservoir verifies that this recommendation is reasonable and practical.(6) Based on the study of constraint mechanisms, the concept and composition of constraint mechanism are proposed. It is herein recommended to improve the ELTPM by using the participation constraint and price constraint of endogenous institutional constraints, to effectively restrict the occurrence of bid-rigging and other misconducts.(7) The recommended improvements for the ELTPM by taking advantage of the participation constraint and price constraint of endogenous institutional constraints are as follows:1) Participation constraint can be realized by taking some measures in the field of qualification for bidding:①use both tender notice and notice of invitation for bids, to invite potential bidders for prequalification and eliminate the risk of full bid-rigging;②carry out quantitative evaluation and provide key evaluation factors, to evaluate the comprehensive strength of potential bidders and also pay attention to their technology and risk management capabilities;③use the limited quantity controlling by indexes of numbers and fractions of potential bidders;④suggest to send the notification of prequalification results and tender documents by email or other measures to secure the prequalification results and reduce the opportunity of collusion after prequalification.2) Price constraint can be realized by fixing an appropriate tender control price according to the specific conditions of procurement and the possibility of collusion, to reduce the motivation and possibility of fully bid-rigging, and, in the case of fully bid-rigging, limit the tenderee’s risk to an acceptable range.Such an improved ELTPM has been applied to the Longbeiwan Hydropower Project successfully, verifying the reasonability and practicability of the recommendations for improvement.(8) On the basis of an analysis of project risks and remedy measures, this paper addresses the impact of the risk attitude on the tender offer by using the game theory, and analyze the effect of shortfall-guarantee and clarification on the risk adjustment mechanism, In order to avoid the risk of malicious prices and other possible improper competition practices arising out of the ELTPM method, it is recommended to give full play to shortfall-guarantee and clarification in bid evaluation in process of bidding. Shortfall-guarantee is an effective way to avoid malicious prices in the scenario of ELTPM. It is recommended to abolish the10\%performance guarantee cap fixed in the "Bidding Law Implementing Regulations" and increase the service charge of shortfall guarantee, with progressive rates applied to improve the shortfall-guarantee effect on adjusting the risk attitude of bidders. Clarification in evaluation adjusts the effect of malicious price risks. The recommended practice of shortfall guarantee and bid clarification has been ever introduced to a certain subway project and a large scaled multipurpose water scheme procured by the ELTPM, effectively avoiding malicious discounts and other unfair competition practices relating to the ELTPM. This verifies the effectiveness and practicability of the recommended shortfall-guarantee and bid clarification in adjusting the risk attitude and risk effect of bidders.(9) According to the participation constraint and incentive compatibility concepts and ideas of the mechanism design theory, this paper proposes the concept of endogenous bidding mechanism by using the institution theory and other research tools, analyzes the elements and functions of endogenous bidding mechanism, and recommends to introduce the endogenous bidding mechanism to water conservancy and hydropower projects in China.(10) This paper analyzes the bidding system reform and path by the latest evolutionary game model available abroad, studies the evolution direction of CEM and ELTPM in the game, and predicts the trend of bid evaluation methods. The ELTPM has many advantages, basically ready for spreading in China. The principle of awarding to the evaluated lowest tender price will be an inevitable trend, the ELTPM will be applied to more and more parts of China, and the bidding market of China will be in line with international practices. Given the Chinese government’s solemn commitment to opening the government procurement market no later than2020, it is herein recommended that the ELTPM be spread to government procurement and water and hydropower projects largely financed by state investments, to prevent the collusion of bidders.

【关键词】 水利工程； 招投标机制； 内生性； 演化博弈；
【Key words】 water conservancy engineering； bidding mechanism； endophytism； evolutionary game；